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B O U N D E D  R A T I O N A L I T Y ,  I N D E T E R M I N A C Y ,  A N D  
T H E  T H E O R Y  O F  T H E  F I R M *  
Roy Radner 
Two issues have become increasingly apparent in attempts to appIy the 
prevailing notions of 'economic rationality' to the theory of the organisation of 
business firms. The first goes under the rubric of bouaded rationalety. This is 
hardly a new idea, and has been forcefully brought to our attention in the work 
of Simon and others, although awareness of the problem (in economics) goes 
back at least to Clark ( I  g I 8) .  I shall try to provide a more detailed taxonomy 
of bounded rationality than is usually done. In particular, it is important to 
distinguish between ( I ) costly rationality, like the costs of observation, 
communication, and even computation, that require only an  extension of the 
standard ' Savage Paradigm ', and ( 2 )  truly bounded rationality, like not 
knowing the implications of everything that one knows, which - as far as I 
know - goes far beyond the Savage paradigm. 
The second issue, which I shall call indeterminacy, arises in attempts to apply 
the theory of strategic games to models of organisations, namely, one often faces 
a very large multiplicity of solutions, which significantly weakens or even 
destroys the predictive power of the theory. By 'solution' I mean here the so- 
called non-cooperative equilibrium, usually associated with the names of 
Auguste Cournot and John Nash (and extended and refined by John Harsanyi, 
Reinhard SeIten and others to cover games in which the players have 
incomplete information). Although indeterminacy can arise even in static 
games with complete information, it seems to be especiaIly prevaIent in 
dynamic games and/or games with incomplete information. 
Both of these issues have profound implications for the organisation of the 
firm. In discussions of this topic, it has become commonplace to set up the straw 
figure of the firm as a black box, mysteriously choosing production and 
investment plans to maximise profits. It is true that there are still undergraduate 
price theory textbooks that present this picture, but economists have long been 
familiar with the phenomenon of the separation ofownership and management, 
at least since the publication of the book by Berle and Means ( I  9321, if not 
before; in fact, Adam Smith had someJ trenchant comments on it (1776, pp. 
264-5). This phenomenon is also referred to as the stparation of ownershi# and 
control (see Fama and Jensen, 1g83). Today, one is likely to see this analysed in 
terms of the 'principal-agent' model, with the owner(s) cast as the principal, 
and the manager(s) as the agent. 
* Thls essay is an abridged and revised version of Radner (rgq6), and I am grateful to the Cambridge 
University Press for permission to use here the material from that paper. I thank Hsueh-Ling Huynh, 
Peter B .  Linhart, and Zur Shapira for comments on earlier drafts. A substantia[ part of the research for this 
paper was done while the author was a t  A T &  T Bell Laboratories. However, the views expressed here axe 
those of the author, and not necessarily those of A T & T  Bell Laboratories 
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Going beyond this model, it is aIso recognised that there are many owners, 
managers, and workers. One approach has been to visualise the firm as a 
'nexus of contracts' (Jensen and MeckIing, I 976). However, it is clear that 
many, if not most, of the relationships and activities within the firm, or even 
between the owners and the managers, are not closely determined by contracts 
in the usual sense of the word, but by expectations about the roles of the various 
actors. This leads to the idea of 'incomplete contracb', in which many 
contingencies are not explicitly covered by the terms of the contract, and yet 
the parties to it have expectations about the probable outcomes in those 
contingencies, If these expectations are mutually consistent and self-fulfilling, 
then we might model an  ' incomplete contract' as a two-part strategic game : 
( I )  the parties first bargain about the explicit terms in the contract, to which 
they are committed, and then ( 2 )  the parties' post-contract actions are 
determined by strategies that form an 'equilibrium' of the post-contract 
strategic game. 
(Of course, all contracts are to some extent incomplete (see, e.g., 
Kornhauser, 19831, but intra-firm contracts may be even more incomplete 
than those between firms. For more on incomplete contracts and related 
material see Hart  ( I  989 ; I ggr ) and Williamson and Winter ( rgg r 1.) 
Finally, the rules of the gum are themselves subject to change, by evolution, 
by mutual consent of the interested parties, or by the direct intervention of an 
outside party. The rational choice of the rules of the game is sometimes called 
the problem of mechanism desiga. 
The paradigm that is implicit in the above account is open to two serious 
criticisms. First, the cognitive requirements placed upon the individual 
decision-makers, not to mention the mechanism designer, in such a model far 
- 
exceed the capacities of present-day humans and computers. This is the 
phenomenon of '  bounded rationality'. Secondly, these models typically do not 
yield sharp predictions. This is the phenomenon of ' indeterminacy'. Notice 
that bounded rationality is a crucial attribute of human bekauiour that is not 
adequately accommodated in our theories. O n  the other hand, indeterminacy 
is an attribute of our theories that prevents us from making sharp predictions 
about behaviour. 
Jn this essay 1 shall try to provide a taxonomy of bounded rationality that 
is more detailed than one usually finds in discussions of the topic by economic 
theorists. I shall also illustrate the phenomenon of indeterminacy in a simple 
model of mechanism design, namely, a ,  model of bargaining about transfer 
prices within a firm. I hope that this discussion will lend some plausibility to 
my judgement that economists will not make further progress on the theory of 
the organisation of firms until we can deaI more successfully with both of these 
phenomena. 
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I .  C O S T L Y  A N D  B O U N D E D  RATIONALITY; D E C E N T R A L I S A T I O N  O F  
I N F O R M A T I O N  A N D  D E C I S I O N  
I .  I . The Savage Paradigm of Decision-Makiag Under Uncertainty 
Although the themes of this section are bounded rationality and multi-person 
decision-making, I start with a brief account of the paradigm of indLidua1 
rational decision-making under uncertainty that is dominant in economics and 
game theory today.  his paradigm is primarily associated with the name of 
L. J. Savage, although Savage himself traced it to Bernoulli, Laplace, de Finetti, 
von Neumann and Morgenstern, and others. In any case, Savage's book, Thd 
Foundatiom of Statistics ( I  9541, remains the deepest and most coherent account 
of what 1 shall call here the 'Savage paradigm'. 
Savage developed his theory primarily to illuminate and rationaIise statistical 
practice, and to resoIve some of the controversies that arose about statistical 
methodology following the appearance of the revolutionary ideas introduced 
by R. A. Fisher and J. Neyman. IronicalIy, his theory had little effect on 
statisticaI practice, but it was embraced by economists and game theorists 
as a powerful model of how decision-makers should respond rationaIly to 
uncertainty and information. 
The theory had three central themes. First, it laid down - as axioms - 
certain minimal principles of consistency of decision in the face of uncertainty, 
which, in Savage's view, embodied all of the notions of rationality that could 
reasonably be imposed. 
Secondly, it showed that these principles of rationality implied that a 
decision-maker's choices among alternative actions could be calculated as a 
function of two 'psychological' scales: ( I )  a numerical scale of probabilities of 
events, and ( 2 )  a numerical scale of the utilities of outcomes. More precisely, 
the rational decision-maker would prefer an  action that yielded the highest 
mathematical expectation of the utiIity of outcome, the expectation being 
defined relative to the decision-maker's scale of probabiIities. 
Thirdly, the theory implied how a decision-maker should rationally modify 
his decisions in the light of new information, or more generally, how the choice 
of actions should evolve in a sequential decision problem as new information 
is accumulated. Thus, although a t  the beginning of their lives as rational 
decision-makers, persons might reasonabIy differ in their beliefs about the 
likelihood of various events, they must all folIow the same rules (formulas) for 
updating those beIiefs in the light of new information. (Essentially, these are the 
rules of the caIculus of conditional pobability, as exemplified by Bayes's Rule.) 
Since most realistic models of economic decision-making involve sequential 
decision, this is a crucial part of the theory in terms of its implications for 
rational behaviour, and will also figure prominently in the discussion of 
bounded rationaIity. 
As sketched above, the Savage paradigm appears not to take account of the 
resources used in the process of decision-making itself. Savage was, of course, 
aware of the fact that decision-making reauires resources, and provided a 
@ Royal Economic Society rqg6 
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lengthy discussion of this matter. Nevertheless, he chose not to incorporate the 
costs of decision-making expIicitly into his model. It is convenient to classify the 
costIy (resource-using) activities of decision-making into three groups : 
I .  observation, or the gathering of information; 
2 .  memory, or the storage of information ; 
3 .  ~om@utation, or the manipulation of information. 
In addition, when we consider groups of decision-makers, we shall have to take 
account of the costs of: 
4. c&nmunication, or the transmission of information. 
Of these activities, and their related costs, the first, second, and fourth can be 
accommodated by the Savage paradigm with relatively little strain, although 
they do have interesting implications. O n  the other hand, as we shaIl see below, 
a serious consideration of the costs of computation leads to serious doubt about 
the realism - or even approximate realism - of the paradigm as a theory of 
human decision-making. 
I .a. Costly Observation and the Wald Paradigm 
In his book, Statistical Decision Functions (1950)~ Abraham Wald codified the 
idea, already implicit in the Neyman-Pearson theory of hypothesis testing, that 
statistical procedures could - or even should - be regarded as methods for 
making decisions in the face of uncertainty. Perhaps stimuIated by his own 
pioneering studies of sequential statistical procedures, he also explicitly 
introduced the cost of observations into his general model of statis tical decision- 
making. The classic example that is said to have led Wald to develop his theory 
of sequential analysis is that of destructive testing in acceptance sampling. 
Typically, in order to fully test an artillery shell one must fire it, and thus 
destroy it (unless, of course, it fails to fire, in which case it is a dud, and also 
useless). Before deciding to accept a lot of, say, 1,000 shells from the 
manufacturer, the U. S. Army would typically test some fixed number of shells 
from the lot, and accept the lot only if the number of defectives in the sample 
were less than some specified level. Since each observation (test of one shell) 
was costly, it was important to minimise the number of shells needed to achieve 
a given standard of reliability of the acceptance procedure. Wald showed how 
this could be done by a sequential procedure ; instead of fixing the sample size in 
advance, the decision-maker should decide after each successive test whether to 
( I  ) continue testing, (a)  stop testing and accept the remaining shells in the lot, 
or (3) stop testing and reject the lot. In fact, under certain conditions, the 
optimal sequential testing procedure produced significant savings as compared 
with any fixed-sample-size procedure. (Wald (1947) was the first to develop a 
systematic theory of sequential statistical procedures; see the Introduction of 
this last reference for a history of previous research on the topic.) 
Other interesting cases of ' costly' observation arose in the study of clinical 
trials. Suppose that several new drugs to treat disease X have been developed 
Q Royal Economic Society r996 
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to the point where they can be tested on human patients. In addition to the out- 
of-pocket costs of administering the drugs (which may be different), there is 
also the 'opportunity cost' of administering an  inferior drug to a patient who 
might otherwise have had a greater probability of a successful trea tment. 
Again, the optimal procedure is a sequential one, in which a decision about 
whether to continue testing a new drug (and whether or not to adopt it) is 
made after observing the results for successive patients or groups of patients. 
(See Basu et al., I ggo.) 
In both of the above examples, there is no difficulty in principle in fitting the 
decision problem into the Savage paradigm, although taking account of the 
costs of observation wi11 typically complicate the analysis. In fact, it is 
interesting to note that problems of clinical trials are notoriously difficult to 
solve analytically, and the numerical computations needed to approximate an  
optima1 policy fairly well are typically very demanding. 
In these examples, it is also necessary for the decision-maker to remember the 
results of previous observations. If the observations are complicated, the 
memory required to do this might be costly, or even infeasib1e in very large 
problems. The casts of memory are in some sense analogous to the cast of 
observation, but not identical. (For a discussion of costly memory in strategic 
games, see Osborne and Rubinstein, (1994, ch, g ) . )  
I. 3. Computation, Commi~nication, and Decentralisation 
The decision-maker who fo11ows the Savage paradigm will typically have to 
perform some computations in order to determine what actions should follow 
from his particular observations. It will be useful in what follows to distinguish 
decisions that are relatively routine, or periodic, from those that are relatively 
unique, or 'one time only', and start our discussion with the former. For 
example, manufacturers periodically update their production plans on the 
basis of observed sales, market research, and observations of the economy. 
Firms periodically process new financial data to determine dividends, short-run 
borrowing, etc. In a large firm, such decision cycles involve the collection and 
processing of vast amounts of data, and the calculation of hundreds or 
thousands of individual decisions. This computational activity is far beyond the 
capability of any single human decision-maker, even when armed with the 
most powerful computer. The computational task involved in corporate 
decision-making is, therefore, divided among many humans and machines. 
Ineuitably, the uctiuities of information processing for decision making are decentralised. 
(In this sense, the activities of decision-making in a firm are not different from 
the activities of physical production.) 
The activities of information processing clearly uses resources - humans, 
machines, materials - and are thus costly. I n  US firms, more than a third, or 
even half, of all employees are engaged in information-processing activities, or 
in jobs that support such activities (Radner, I 992). 
But there is an  additional, more subtle, 'cost' of information proc.essing, 
namely the cost of delay. This is not an out-of-pocket cost, like salaries, machine 
maintenance, etc., but a loss of profit due to the degradation of the resulting 
D Royal Economic Society 1996 
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decision. For example, if it takes a year to process the statistics on recent sales, 
the resulting production plan wilI probably be obsolete long before it is 
completed. U p  to a point, such deIays can be reduced by the use of more 
information processors - human and machine. This is analogous to replacing a 
single 'seriaI' computer with a 'parallel machine' made up of many serial ones. 
However, it is a striking 'law' of computer science that, duen with an unlimited 
degree of parallelisattion, the com@utational delay must increase unboundedly with the size 
of  the problem, given the technological capabilities of the component processors. 
( I t  would be more accurate to characterise this statement as a folk theorem rather 
than a general mathematical result; see Schwartz (1980) ; and Radner (1993) .) 
For example, suppose that every T units of time a cohort of N numbers 
arrives, whose sum must be calculated. Suppose further that one has available 
P identical ' addition processors ', and that the units of time are chosen (e.g., 
one microsecond) so that each processor takes one unit of time to do an 
addition. It can be shown that, no matter how large P is, and how the task of 
addition is divided up among the individual processors, it will take at least 
units oftime to add the N numbers. This illustrates what I shall call the iron Law of  
delay. Furthermore, the number of processors needed to attain this minimum 
delay will be a t  least 
(1 +log, w w / 2  TI, 
a smaller number of processors will result in an even longer delay. This 
illustrates what I shall call the iron law of size. (Of course, to obtain this precise 
result, one needs a precise model of computation; see Radner (1993) and 
Radner and Van Zandt (1992) for detaiIs. In fact, this result holds for any 
associative operation, not j ust addition.) The delay can be further reduced only 
by using faster (and hence more costly) individual processors, which also has 
its limits, given the state of computing technology. 
Information processing aIso typically requires that incoming data and 
intermediate results be stored in some memory. This adds further to the cost of 
information processing, and to the delays, as well, since it takes time to read 
data into a memory and to access the information that is stored there. 
Armchair empiricism suggests that machine memory is in some sense relatively 
cheap compared to computation, a t  least in the current state of technology. 
Finally, the decentralisation of information processing (parallel processing) 
requires that the individual processors communicate with each other. Such 
communication requires additional resources and causes additional delays. 
Again, in the present state of technoIogy, it seems that information traasmission 
is relatively cheap, compared to computation in the narrow sense ; witness the 
flood of 'junk ' mail, telephone calls, and E-mail, It appears that today i t  is 
much easier and cheaper to send and receive memos and papers than it is to 
process ' them. 
The costs and delays attributable to information processing have an  obvious 
but important implication for organisation: it wiII not be efficient (except in the 
Q Royal Economic Society t996 
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tiniest organisations) for every decision to use all of the information available 
to the organisation as a whole. In fact, in a large organisation, only a smaIl 
fraction of the available information will be brought to bear on any single 
decision; the efficient choice of inrormation will be influenced by its cost and 
its relevance to the decision in question. Combining this observation with the 
fact that individual decision-makers (processors) are limited in their capacities 
for information processing, one is led to the ineuit~bilit~ of decentralised deciszon- 
making, in which different decisions - or groups of decisions - are made by 
different decision-makers on the basis of different information. 
1.4. Deciding How to Decide: Truly Bounded Ratioaality 
The considerations sketched in the last two sections make the typicaI problem 
of rational decision-making under uncertainty appear much more complicated 
than the simple examples one encounters in textbooks on microeconomic 
theory and management science. Nevettheless, one can, in priac$le, stretch the 
Savage paradigm to accommodate the various costs, individual capacitia, and 
delays, associated with observation, memory, computation, and communi- 
cation in 'routine' decision-making. I shall call this suitably 'stretched' theory 
the Extended Savage Paradigm. 
I n  fact, I chose to talk about 'routine' decision-making only to fix the ideas. 
Nothing about the theoretical rramework necessarily prevents it from being 
applied to one-of-a-kind decisions. In particular, one example of a one-of-a- 
kind decision is the problem or devising decision-rules for a given set of routine 
decisions. In other words, it would appear that the extended Savage paradigm 
can be applied to the study of rational decision-making in the firm at all levels. 
This, in fact, was the research ptogramme set forth in The Economic Theory of 
T e a m  (Marschak and Radnet, 1972).  
I t  may be instructive to inquire why progress on that research programme 
has been so slow in the past two decades. In the theory of teams, it seemed 
convenient to distinguish between ( I )  the organisation proper, including the 
members of the team, their tasks, their statistical decision rules, and the 
structure of observation and communication in the team, and ( 2 )  the 
' organiser' or 'designer' who determines everything described in ( I ) .  It  soon 
became evident that even some simple problems in team theory could quickly 
become analytically - and even computationally - intractabIe, from the point of 
view of the organiser. If this were true or the simplified theoretical modeIs of the 
theory, how much more so would it be true of the decision problems of real 
firms ! (For references to literature on team theory see Van Zandt ( I  995) and 
Kim and Roush ( I  987) .) 
Here we come face to face with the hard core of 'bounded rationality '. It is 
not that, in themselves, the costs of observation, communication, memory 
storage, and routine computation, necessarily prevent a team of decision 
makers from conforming to the Savage paradigm of rationaIity. Rather, it is 
that the task of designing decision tules that satisfy Savage's consistency 
requirements is beyond the intellectual capabilities of any organiser or team of 
organisers. 
8 Rayal Economic Society 1996 
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Savage understood this problem, although he did not have a satisfactory 
formal soIution to it. He  contrasted the two proverbs, ' Look before you leap ', 
and 'You can cross that bridge when you come to i t1.  
Carried to its logical extreme, the 'Look before you leap' principle 
demands that one envisage every conceivable policy for the government of 
his whole life (at least from now on) in its most minute details, in the light 
of the vast number of unknown states of the world, and decide here and 
now on one policy. This is utterly ridiculous, not - as some might think 
- because there might later be cause for regret, if things did not turn out 
as had. been anticipated, but because the task implied in making such a 
decision is not even remotely resembled by human possibility. I t  is even 
beyond our power to plan a picnic or play a game of chess in accordance 
with the principle, even when the world of states and the set of available 
acts to be envisaged are artificially reduced to the narrowest reasonable 
limits. (Savage, 1954, p. 16.) 
T o  put it another way, decision makers are not merely uncertain about 
'empirical' events such as, ' I t  will rain tomorrow in New York City', or 
' General Motors has developed an  efficient electric automobile'. They are also 
uncertain about logical inferences, such as ' Fermat's Last Theorem follows 
from the axioms of arithmetic', or ' The r ngrd digit in the decimal expansion 
of pi is 3'. Or, if these seem far removed from the business world, try: ( I )  'Given 
all I know about the old and new drugs for treating a particular disease, what 
is the optimal poIicy for conducting clinical trials on the new ones?', or 
(a)  'Given all that AT & T's management knows about the telecommunications 
industry, and about AT & T's capabilities, what should be its business strategy 
for the next five years?', or especially, (3)  'Given a11 that is known, 
theoreticaIly and empirically, about business organisations in genera[, and 
about telecommunications and AT & T in particular, should AT & T re- 
organise itself internally, and if so, how? ' 
Essentially, what we are dealing with here is the decision-maker's uncertainty 
about the logical imfilications of what he kmzows. Although I cannot justify it 
scientifically, I have a feeling that this kind of uncertainty is at least as 
important in business (and other) decision-making as uncertainty about 
empirical events - and perhaps even more so. In any case, I am not aware of 
any generally acceptable theory of what it means to be rational in the face of 
such uncertainty. (See, however, Lipman ( I  995) for a start in this direction.) 
This confronts the economist with a dilemma. O n  the one hand, he or she 
can continue to investigate models of 'rational' decision-making that are 
simple enough to be tractable for the economist, but are hopelessly unrealistic 
(this is the current mainstream approach). O n  the other hand, a t  the risk of 
being branded a ' behavioural economist', he or she can abandon the attempt 
to explain observed behaviour as 'rational', and simply record various 
empirical regularities, e.g., ' rules of thumb '. As a compromise, the economist 
can try to show that competition will weed out 'irrationaI1 or 'non-optimal' 
behaviour in the long run, even though individual decision-makers and 
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organisations are not themselves capable of deIiberately determining what is 
optimal; in some sense, this is the best of all possible worlds. (See, e.g., Winter 
( I  ggr  ) and the references cited there. I should mention, however, that Winter 
is generally criticaI of the con~petitive selection hypothesis, a t  least in its starkest 
forms.) 
1 1 .  C O N F L I C T  A N D  T H E  D E C E N T R A L I S A T I O N  O F  A U T H O R I T Y  
11. I .  Conjictiag Goals and the Power of Decentralised Infor~nation 
Thus far 1 have discussed decision-making in the firm as if it were simply an 
extension of a one-person decision problem to a group of persons and machines, 
this extension being made necessary by the limitations on the capacities of 
individuals to perform the various activities required in the process of making 
decisions. However - as economists and other social scientists are fond of 
em~hasising - different persons in an  organisation are likely to have conflicting 
goals, or a t  least partly so, and these conflicts are likely to impose further 'costs' 
on the organisation. 
Of course, if the firm has a sole owner, and if the persons hired by the owner 
are told exactly what to do in all circumstances, and are perfectly monitored 
and disciplined, then the fact that they have conff icting underIying goals will 
be harmless (to the owner). But if the persons are hired to make decisions, and 
the information and decision-making is decentralised in sense of the preceding 
sections, then the individual decision-makers will in general have some freedom 
to take some actions that are more in their own interest - and less in the interest 
of the owner - than they would if the owner were in complete controI. Thus the 
decdntralisation of information and decision confer1 power on the individual decision-makers 
(subordinates?), which they may be able to use to further their own interests 
a t  the owner's expense. The situation is even more complex if there is more than 
one owner, and especially if some or all of the owners are also decision-makers 
in the firm. 
11.2. Incentiues and Mdchaaism Destgn 
To study the effects of conflicting goals in the presence of decentralised 
information and decision-making, economic theorists - and experimentalists, 
too - have primarily utilised the general model of 'games of strategy '. In any 
particular instance, the model specifies : ( I )  who are the ' players ' in the game, 
i.e., the decision-makers; (a)  what strategies are available to each player; and 
(3)  the 'payoff function', which specifies the expected utility for each player 
corresponding to each profile of strategies chosen by the players. Thus the 
'Games Paradigm' extends the Savage paradigm by making a decision- 
maker's utility depend both on his actions and on the actions of other decision- 
makers, as well as on the 'state of nature' or natural environment, which is 
beyond any decision-maker's control. The most widely used predictive concepts 
are some variation on the idea of a 'Nash equilibrium', namely, a profile of 
strategies such that no player can increase his expected utility by t~nilaterally 
changing his own strategy. 
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In the application of game theory to the design of organisations, it is 
imagined that the 'organiser ' (owner?) can choose the rules of the game - and 
hence the number of players, their strategy sets, etc. -subject only to some 
constraints that reff ect the available technology (including the technology of 
information processing), the availability of employees, the outside opportunities 
of potential employees, etc. I t  is understood that the organiser may be one of 
the pIayers in the game, or may represent 'society'. It is also imagined that the 
organiser will make this (constrained) choice to maximise his own expected 
utility; this is called the problem of mechanism design. Here the 'mechanism' 
refers to the particular rules of the game chosen by the organiser. 
I n  order to predict what expected utilities for the organiser and other players 
will result from a particular mechanism, theorists typically predict that the 
players will adopt a Nash profile of strategies. According to this theory, if the 
organiser chooses a mechanism so as to maximise his own utility, then he will 
predict that for any choice of mechanism he will receive the utility 
corresponding to a Nash profile for that mechanism. A mechanism, with an 
associated Nash profile, is called second-best (given the technology and 
preferences of the players), if there is no Nash profile of any mechanism that 
makes every player (including the organiser) as well off, and some player 
strictly better off. 
I t  is interesting that the general theory of mechanism design has thus far 
made little headway in illuminating the choice among alternative architectures 
of incentives and decision-making in the firm. The examination of a specific 
design probIem for the firm may shed some light on the difficulties. I take as 
my example the problem of transfer pricing, and specificaIly, the design of 
bargaining mechanisms. 
Divisions of large firms often 'buy'  goods and services from other divisions 
of the same firm, and there has been much discussion of the question of how to 
organise such interdivisional transfers, and the corresponding ' transfer prices'. 
Although various formal accounting procedures have been used for this (e.g., 
'cost-plus pricing'), it is also common to allow the divisions to bargain about 
whether the transfer should be accomplished, and a t  what price. I n  order to 
bring analysis to bear on the d a t i v e  merits of different mechanisms, e.g., 
whether cost-pIus is better than bargaining, we need models of how the 
participants would behave under these different mechanisms. I shall iIlustrate 
this with a standard game-theoretic model of bargaining in an  extremely 
simple situation. 
Suppose that there are two divisions, say S and 3, and that division B (the 
'buyer') is interested in obtaining a lot of 50,000 custom parts from division S 
(the 'supplier'). The lot will have a value of V to B, if B obtains it;  that is, V 
is the maximum that B would pay to obtain the lot from S. (This is sometimes 
called B's ' reservation price', it may reflect the price a t  which B could obtain 
a comparable lot from an outside source.) Correspondingly, it will cost S an  
amount C to provide the lot to B. (This reservation price may reffect S's 
opportunities for using its productive capacities in some other way.) From the 
point of view of the firm, the transfer shouId take place if V is at least as large 
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as C, in which case the transfer price should divide the 'surplus' ( V -  C) in some 
'equitable' way between the two divisions. The problem is that B does not 
know S's cost, C, and S does not know 3's value, V; furthermore, the firm's 
management knows neither. The firm wants to design a mechanism that will 
result - in situations like this - in as efficient an outcome as possible, i.e., a 
second-best combination of mechanism and Nash profile. 
A familiar example of a mechanism is the 'sealed-bid' mechanism. The rules 
of the game are as follows: ( I )  simultaneousIy, the buyer picks an  offer bid, say 
v ,  and the seller picks an asking bid, say c (we may think of each bid as being 
placed in a seaIed envelope) ; ( 2 )  the sealed bids are opened, and if v is a t  least 
as Iarge as c, then S provides the lot to B ;  otherwise no transfer takes place; 
(3)  if the transfer takes place, the transfer price, p ,  is the arithmetic mean of the 
two bids, i.e., p = ( I ,  + L )  / 2 .  If a transfer takes place, the buyer's profit (on this 
transaction) is ( V-p) and the seller's profit is (J - C) ; if no transfer takes place, 
then each player's profit is zero. (I assume that if no transfer takes place, then 
the seller incurs no cost.) 
Recall, however, that B does not know C, and S does not know V. Following 
the theory of Harsanyi, the game- theorist will typicaIIy model the situation as 
follows. V and C are random variables with a given joint probability 
distribution, which is known to both players, B and S. At the beginning of the 
game, 'Nature' draws particular values, V and C, from this distribution, and 
reveals V to B and C to S. A strategy for B is a rule or function, sayf, that 
determines his bid, u,  as f( V ) .  Likewise, a strategy for S is a function, say g, that 
determines his bid, c, as g(C). Notice that there is no obligation for B to bid his 
true value, nor for S to bid his true cost, In fact, armchair experience wouId 
suggest that f ( V )  would typicalIy be less than V, and g(C) would be greater 
than C. Finally, we postulate that each player is interested in maximising his 
expected profit, given the other pIayer's strategy. A Nash profile is a pair of bidding 
strategies, (p,g*), such that neither player can increase his expected profit by 
uniLaterally changing his own strategy to some other one. 
The reader may be surprised by a feature of the above formulation, namely, 
that the buyer must decide what he would bid for every possible realisation of 
his actual value, V, even though the transfer-price story begins with the buyer 
knowing V  (and likewise for the seller). However, a littIe reflection should 
convince the reader that, in order for the buyer to predict the consequences of 
any particular bid, he must have some opinion about what the seller is likely 
to ask. One way for the buyer to formulate this opinion is ( I )  to predict what 
the seller will ask given alternative realisations of his cost, i.e., predict the 
seller's strategy, and (2)  to impute a probability distribution to the cost, as in 
the Savage paradigm. Similar reasoning is applicable to the seller. 
J shall not try here to give a general definition of a 'mechanism' in this 
situation, but here is an  alternative to the seaIed-bid mechanism, sometimes 
called the ' take-it-or-leave-it ' mechanism. In this mechanism, the seller makes 
an  asking bid, and the buyer must either accept it or reject it;  in the latter case, 
there is no trade. (A corresponding mechanism would be obtained by 
interchanging the roles of the buyer and seller.) 
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To continue the discussion of the sealed-bid mechanism. Suppose that the 
probability distribution of V and C is such that they are independent and identically 
distributed, each with a untform distribution between o and r .  I t  can be shown that the 
following bidding strategies form a Wash profile: 
Thus the buyer bids his true value, V, when V is sufficiently small, but 'shaves' 
his bid for larger values of V, and the seller behaves symmetrically. Although 
this qualitative feature of the player's strategies may be intuitively plausible, 
the particular form and coefficients of the (piecewise linear) functions f * and 
g* are surely not. It can also be shown that the seaIed-bid mechanism, in 
combination with the Nash profile (N) ,  is in fact efficient (second-best) in the 
class of all mechanisms that are reIevant for this problem, with the assumed 
probability distribution of V and C. This makes the sealed-bid mechanism seem 
attractive in this situation, until one learns that, under the same assumptions, 
the sealed-bid mechanwm has an uncountable injinity of Nash projles, which range from 
eJzcient to worthbxs! (By 'worthless' I mean yielding each player an  expected 
profit of zero.) (For this and other facts about the sealed-bid mechanism 
described here, see Leininger et al.  (1q8g) .  For a survey of game-theoretic 
treatments of bargaining under incompIete information, see Linhart dt al .  
(19921.) 
In this situation, the organiser of the firm (the mechanism designer) faces 
some difficult problems : 
I .  How could we reliably say that the sealed-bid mechanism is ' efficient ', if 
we do not know which Nash profile the players will choose? 
2 .  How are the players to coordinate their choice of strategies to obtain a 
Nash profile? One answer to this question might be that the mechanism 
designer should tell the players which strategies to choose, and expIain why. 
This will work, and also soIve the preceding problem, if both players actually 
take the designer's advice. However, this does not solve the next problem. 
3. The  strategies described by ( I )  are efficient for the particular prior 
probability distribution of V and C. However, the efficient combination of 
mechanism and Nash profile depends on that prior, probably in a sensitive 
way. (Although, even for the sealed-bid mechanism, Nash profiIes are known 
for only a small class of distributions, and even then not all the Nash profiles 
are known!) 
4. In the above formulation, the two pIayers agree on what the prior 
distribution of V and C is. What if they do not agree? 
5. How can we expect the pIayers to calculate Nash profiles of a particular 
mechanism, if the mechanism designer cannot do so? In fact, the caIculation of 
a Nash profile, even in this simple problem, typicalIy requires the solution of a 
difficult pair of differential equations. It is interesting to note that, in the 
experiments that have been done with the two-person sealed-bid mechanism, 
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with the experimental conditions devised to replicate the above assumptions, 
the experimental subjects rarely appear to use Nash-profiIe strategies. However, 
on average they do about as weII as they would if they used the efficient Nash 
profile ( I ) ,  but with different strategies. Furthermore, subject pairs use a 
variety of strategy profiles, which nevertheless achieve comparable average 
profits (see Radner and Schotter (1939) and Linhart et  al. ( 1 9 9 2 ) ) .  
Although I have discussed here only one mechanism in any detail, it should 
not lx surprising that, with all of these problems, it is dificult to come to 
definite conclusions about the best mechanism to use for transfer-pricing. This 
discouraging situation raises serious questions about the ultimate prospects for 
the game-theoretic approach to mechanism design, a t  least as we now know it. 
111. C O N C L U S I O N  
I have argued that costIy rationality alone leads to the decentralisation of 
information processing, decision making, and incentives in firms. I have also 
argued that truly bounded rationality (uncertainty about the logical 
implications of what one knows), together with indeterminacy of equilibrium, 
make the current game-theoretic approach to the theory of the firm both 
implausible and inadequate. Although the game-theoretic approach has 
proved to be a useful abstraction, in my opinion it has also missed significant 
features of the organisation of firms, which can only be explained by a 
satisfactory theory of truly bounded rationality. 
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